Introduction
Policies designed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions through the The results demonstrate the potential connections between greenhouse gas mitigation policies across sectors. We examine the large economic and potentially quite small emissions impacts that could result from exposing agriculture to the international emissions price. We also examine the land use and emissions implications of proposed policies that would give landowners emissions credits for regenerating indigenous forest and scrub. In the absence of a parallel policy for production forestry, the results are surprising and potentially disappointing for proponents of biodiversity. For the remainder of this article we discuss results produced from LURNZv1-climate. Given that the relationships driving the land-use responses in LURNZv1-climate are still under development, the underlying mechanisms of the model will be examined further before results can be considered robust in terms of timing or magnitude. Thus, the results presented should be taken as qualitative illustrations of issues arising from the modelled policies.
About LURNZ-climate

Charging farmers for their land-use emissions
As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, the government is obliged to the effects of the charge would flow on through the economy. Sin et al (2004) found that the areas likely to be hardest hit by an emissions charge would be Gore and MacKenzie in the South Island, and Taihape, Waipukurau, Te Kuiti and Dannevirke in the North Island. The effect on the economy as a whole may not be large after an initial period of adjustment if the revenue from the charge were recycled into other tax cuts, but the transfers of income between people and the dislocation in some communities would be significant.
In response to such a policy, some marginal land is likely to change to a lower emitting land use. If, for example, sheep/beef farming on a parcel of marginal land is no longer profitable, the land is likely to enter plantation forestry or a state, which we refer to as regenerating forest and scrub, in which no economic activity is discernable. It is also likely that some land will move from dairy to sheep/beef (or not convert to dairy as soon -if dairy prices and conversions continue to be high). For example, facing such a charge, farms considering converting to dairy would find that the difference between their current returns in sheep/beef farming and the returns they could potentially earn in dairy would be reduced. This is because dairy farming has higher emissions per hectare than sheep/beef farming so they face a higher charge. For some farms on the margin for conversion to dairy, this effect might be large enough to make sheep/beef more profitable than dairy, and so these farms might choose not to convert and thereby reduce New Zealand's total emissions. In all cases, the resulting land-use changes will result in lower emitting land use, achieving the goal of the policy. However, the costs to enterprises and rural economies may be sufficiently large that the policy is not currently justified, relative to other policies that would induce emissions reductions in other sectors.
To examine the impact of a NZ$50 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent charge on New Zealand agriculture, we ask, how big would the corresponding emissions reductions be? To answer this, we first need to know what would have happened if no policy was introduced. To tell us this, we simulate a reference case scenario. The reference case gives us a line against which we can measure the effectiveness of the policy, allowing us to observe the magnitude of the policy effect and discern whether the policy is achieving its intended result. To find out how much the charge would reduce emissions, we model the charge as a reduction in the commodity price that farmers receive, assuming that farmers will respond to the charge in the same way as a commodity price shock. From 2003 onwards, we reduce the commodity prices relative to those we used in the reference case by the equivalent of 60 cents for milk solids and 85 cents for meat and wool; these reductions correspond to a charge of $50 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. We expect that, when compared to the reference case, dairy would expand less, sheep/beef would contract more, plantation forests would expand more, and regenerating forest and scrub would contract less. As a result, we expect that the rise in emissions would be reduced and indeed this is the case. The dashed line in the figure shows net emissions associated with this scenario.
We find that dairy area contracts by 1% with the policy, whereas in the 
Rewarding farmers for regeneration of marginal land
The Government might be able to induce a greater reduction in emissions and at the same time reduce the impact on farmers, if the government rewarded the regeneration of indigenous forest and scrub on marginal land. The Government has developed a policy called the Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative (PFSI) that would provide such an alternative. In addition to lowering agricultural emissions by reducing the land area in agriculture, the PFSI would encourage landowners to sequester carbon in forest biomass (Trotter et al., 2005) . Reversion of native forest also has other benefits, including on biodiversity (Hall, 2001 ) and water quality. These are not considered further here.
We simulate the effect of awarding farmers $50 for every tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent that is removed from the atmosphere by native forest The reason for this unexpected result is that regenerating forest and scrub compete with plantation forestry for land. Regenerating forest and scrub expansion has occurred at the expense of plantation forestry expansion and consequently, plantation forestry area expands at a slower rate in this scenario than in the previous scenarios. Net emissions increase because young regenerating forest and scrub remove much less carbon dioxide from the atmosphere than young plantation forests. This is a short-term problem; in the long run, removals by naturally regenerating vegetation surpass those by plantation forestry.
However, this effect would actually make meeting our obligations for the first
Kyoto commitment period more difficult.
This result suggests that the PFSI has the potential to achieve a 'perverse' result during 2008-2012, by actually making New Zealand's net position under the Kyoto Protocol worse. Rather than suggesting that the PFSI is poor policy, this result emphasizes that even policies with the potential to produce multiple environmental benefits such as the PFSI must be considered as part of an overall picture. In this case, the PFSI would be enhanced if plantation forestry were rewarded for carbon sequestration as well. Our preliminary results suggest that the government should consider also rewarding plantation forestry particularly if they want short-term emission gains.
Similarly, the impacts of levying a charge on land use related emissions from agriculture would ideally be examined in the context of carbon charges or emissions trading in the fossil fuel sector. This is not possible with any current model.
Summary
These illustrative simulations demonstrate that LURNZv1-climate is a useful tool for analysing potential greenhouse gas mitigation policies intended to reward or tax emissions resulting from land use activities. Our first simulation
indicates that an agricultural emissions charge based simply on land use would be highly disruptive and may not be very effective in reducing emissions. Our second simulation shows that the inclusion of a reward for regenerating forest and scrub without a similar reward for plantation forestry might negatively impact on plantation forestry, increasing emissions growth in the short-run. This demonstrates the potential for policies to have unintended, and potentially perverse impacts when policies are not aligned across sectors.
The model results illustrate the importance of careful empirical analysis of potential policies, and emphasize the need for tools such as LURNZ that are applicable to New Zealand's unique situation. The results presented here are preliminary in that they illustrate the probable scale and direction of policy impacts but the exact size of those impacts may not be robust. We are currently developing a second version of LURNZ-climate, which will be much more robust, and thus lend more weight to our future results.
Finally, when developing LURNZv1-climate we used publicly available data whenever it was available. We did this to support our aim of making both LURNZ-climate and the LURNZ-climate database freely available for research purposes whenever possible. We hope others will use our data and model to explore these issues further. For more information, please visit www.motu.org.nz/land_use_nz.htm.
